扶贫贴息贷款:博弈分析与路径选择

扶贫贴息贷款推广近30年来在发展中逐步变革,但效果均不理想。通过构建地方政府与承贷机构博弈模型,并结合湖北宣恩县的案例进行相关验证发现,其原因在于地方政府和承贷机构均因满足于既得利益而陷入了激励陷阱。因此,通过建立网络动态信息监督机制,将益贫效果、社会效益及扶贫资金使用绩效列入地方政府政绩考核的主要指标,以及在扶贫贴息贷款和扶贫互助资金合作社之间构建垂直型的＂金融联结＂等策略,方可优化博弈双方信息对称度,平衡双方得益水平,弱化承贷机构＂嫌贫爱富＂动机,从而重构符合新农村金融体系建设要求的新纳什均衡。

A Solution Analysis of Discount Micro lending (DML) Development Based on Game Theory

The discount micro-lending （DML） program has been conducted for nearly 30 years while its inefficiency calls for much concern. A dynamic game model regarding banks and the local government was built in this essay, combined with which a case study was introduced. In conclusion, the result shows that the two parties in the game are so satisfied with the benefit they already hold that they are trapped in a paradox of motivation. Policy suggestions are proposed such as a network of monitoring scheme should be built, an achievement test should be designed and a financial linkage should be considered in order to reach a new Nash equilibrium.