大股东资金占用与审计约束

以大股东资金占用作为大股东与中小股东之间代理冲突的替代变量,研究审计对这一代理冲突的约束作用。实证研究表明,大股东非经营性资金占用越严重,被出具非标准审计意见的可能性越大,而大股东经营性资金占用与被出具非标准审计意见的正相关关系不显著;被出具了非标准审计意见的公司,其大股东占用资金在未来年度将会减少。审计能有效约束大股东资金占用。

Major Shareholders Occupying the Funds and Auditing Restraint

In this paper, we use the major shareholders occupying the funds of listed companies as an alternative variable of proxy conflict between the major shareholder and small,medium-sized shareholders,to do research on the function of audit opinion in this proxy conflict. Empirical results show that the more seriously the major shareholders occupy the non-operating funds, the more likely it will be issued non-standard audit opinions in the report by the auditors. The positive correlation between the major shareholders occupying the operating funds and non-standard audit opinions was not significant, and when it was a non-standard audit opinions issued by the division of the company, its major shareholder funds in the coming year occupation will be reduced. This shows that the auditing can effectively restraint major shareholders occupying the funds.