Oligarchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness |
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Authors: | Tanaka Yasuhito |
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Institution: | (1) Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kamigyoku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan. E-mail |
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Abstract: | We study the existence of a group of individuals which has some decisive power for social choice correspondences that satisfy a monotonicity property which we call modified monotonicity. And we examine the relation between modified monotonicity and strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences according to the definition by Duggan and Schwartz (2000). We will show mainly the following two results. (1) Modified monotonicity implies the existence of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a group of individuals such that it has some decisive power (semi-decisiveness), and at least one of the most preferred alternatives of every its member is always chosen by any social choice correspondence. (2) Strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences is equivalent to modified monotonicity. |
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Keywords: | modified monotonicity oligarchy social choice correspondences strategy-proofness weak dictator |
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