| 中央政府与地方政府风险基础建设的静态博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王玉雷,李文鸿,周凤航. 中央政府与地方政府风险基础建设的静态博弈研究[J]. 河南工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2011, 7(3): 53-55 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王玉雷 李文鸿 周凤航 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 河南工业大学理学院,河南郑州,450001
2. 河南工业大学学报编辑部,河南郑州,450001 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，河南省教育厅自然科学基金，河南工业大学引进人才基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用静态博弈模型对我国风险行业安全生产基础设施建设中存在的中央政府和地方政府博弈的现象进行了理论研究。研究结果与实际情况较为吻合,但是由于忽视了激励机制,所以该模型并不能为政府提高中央预算的比例提供理论依据。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险行业 基础设施建设 博弈模型 |
ANALYSIS OF THE STATIC GAME OF RISK INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT |
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| WANG Yu-lei,LI Wen-hong,ZHOU Feng-hang. ANALYSIS OF THE STATIC GAME OF RISK INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT[J]. Journal of Henan University of Technology(Social Science Edition), 2011, 7(3): 53-55 |
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| Authors: | WANG Yu-lei LI Wen-hong ZHOU Feng-hang |
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| Affiliation: | WANG Yu-lei,LI Wen-hong,ZHOU Feng-hang(School of Sciences,Henan University of Technology,Zhengzhou 450001,China,School of Economics,Zhongnan University of Economics & Law,Wuhan 430073,Editorial Dept.,China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper uses a model of static game to conduct a theoretical study of the phenomenon of game-playing between central and local government existing in industrial safety infrastructure construction for risk industries.The findings tally with the actuality.But since motivating mechanism has been neglected,this model can not provide a theoretical basis for government to raise the proportion of central budget. |
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| Keywords: | risk industry infrastructure construction game model |
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