The value of a player in n-person games |
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Authors: | Kjell Hausken Matthias Mohr |
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Institution: | (1) School of Economics, Culture and Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, P.O. Box 2557 Ullandhaug, N-4091 Stavanger, Norway (e-mail: Kjell.Hausken@oks.his.no), NO;(2) Deutsche Bundesbank, Economics Department, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14-16, P.O. Box 100602, D-60006 Frankfurt am Main, Germany (e-mail: Matthias.Mohr@bundesbank.de), DE |
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Abstract: | . The article decomposes the Shapley value into a value matrix which gives the value of every player to every other player
in n-person games. Element Φij(v) in the value matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row player i is beneficial, has no impact, or is not beneficial for column player j. The elements in each row and in each column of the value matrix sum up to the Shapley value of the respective player. The
value matrix is illustrated by the voting procedure in the European Council of Ministers 1981–1995.
Received: 9 September 1998/Accepted: 11 February 2000 |
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Keywords: | |
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