| 外部创新技术的许可博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 闫庆友,李瑛莹. 外部创新技术的许可博弈分析[J]. 华北电力大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 0(4): 17-21 |
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| 作者姓名： | 闫庆友 李瑛莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 华北电力大学,工商管理学院,北京,102206 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文利用博弈论的方法,分别建立了许可博弈模型,主要分析了具有完全信息和具有道德风险两种情况下外部创新者与潜在受让人之间的技术许可问题。通过均衡解与预期收益的权衡比较,本文的结论是在存在道德风险的情况下,两部制许可方式是外部创新者与潜在受让人在技术许可博弈中可供选择的最优转让方式。
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| 关 键 词： | 外部创新 完全信息 道德风险 许可博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-2603(2006)04-0017-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-08-20 |
Game Analysis of Outside Innovation Licensing |
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| YAN Qing-you,LI Ying-ying. Game Analysis of Outside Innovation Licensing[J]. Journal of North China Electric Power University(Social Sciences), 2006, 0(4): 17-21 |
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| Authors: | YAN Qing-you LI Ying-ying |
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| Abstract: | Using game theory,this paper builds licensing game models respectively, and mainly analyzes licensing game problems between outside innovator and potential licensee with complete information and with moral hazard.Comparing equilibrium solution with expectable income,the paper makes a result that license contract with two-part tariff may be the optimal licensing strategy choosed by outside innovator and potential licensee in the case of moral hazard. |
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| Keywords: | outside innovation complete information moral hazard licensing game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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