On the historical explanation of unique events

Among the intriguing issues over which philosophers and historians tend to disagree is the general character of historical explanations of events that are unique. Philosophers argue that every event is actually unique, but that any event may be explained, nevertheless, insofar as it happens to be one of a certain kind. Historians protest that this conception ignores the particularity of individual events and especially the fact that such an event may very well be the only one of its kind. As a result, historians tend to dismiss the philosopher's arguments as ‘purely theoretical’, while philosophers tend to dismiss the historian's retort as ‘merely methodological’, phrases that, within this context, at least, are clearly intended to have pejorative connotations. The purpose of this paper is to undertake an arbitration of this dispute by indicating what appear to be the strengths and weaknesses of both positions, while suggesting the view that more is involved here than either side at various times has been prepared to admit.