SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND TAX POLICY DESIGN: SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE |
| |
| Authors: | LUCY F ACKERT JORGE MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ MARK RIDER |
| |
| Institution: | Ackert:;Professor, Michael J. Coles College of Business, 1000 Chastain Road, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144. Phone 770-423-6111, Fax 770-499-3209, E-mail:;and Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street NE, Atlanta, GA 30309-4470. Martinez-Vazquez:;Professor, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta Street, Atlanta, GA 30303. Phone 404-651-3989, Fax 404-651-4449, E-mail: Rider:;Associate Professor, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta Street, Atlanta, GA 30303, Phone 404-651-1687, Fax 404-651-4449, E-mail: |
| |
| Abstract: | This article reports the results of a set of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people's preferred tax structure. Using the Fehr and Schmidt model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing between alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases as the deadweight loss from progressive taxation increases. Our findings have important implications for tax policy design. ( JEL C92, D63, H21, H23) |
| |
| Keywords: | |
|
|
