不确定交货条件下供应链协调的 Stackelberg 对策研究

研究了在不确定交货条件下的一种供应链协调机制———Stackelberg 主从对策. 供应链中 的生产商作为主方,以成本最小为目标给出最佳的订货量和惩罚成本策略;供应商作为从方, 以使其效益最大化的最佳额外生产能力作为响应策略. 最后,以上海宝钢集团企业开发总公司 的尾板卷深加工为实际背景,采用遗传算法进行了仿真计算,结果表明主从对策的供应链协调 机制的有效性.

Study on Stackelberg game of supply chain coordination with uncertain delivery

Coordinating producer and supplier is one of main issues of supply chain with uncertain delivery. Consid2 ering interaction between the members in supply chain , there is a Stackelberg game in supply chain. The nature of the Stackelberg game is discussed in this paper. The solution of the game is deduced. As the leader , the producer in supply chain initializes the optimal order quantity and penalty cost policy for minimizing his cost , while as the fol2 lower , the supplier responds with the optimal extra capacity policy for maximizing his profit . Appling genetic algo2 rithm , a simulation about tail rolled steel products is done based on Shanghai BaoSteel industry &trade co. . The solution is adopted for implementing J IT in the supply systemof Shanghai BaoSteel industry &trade co. . The simu2 lation solution shows that Stackelberg game is effective and practical .