基于企业治污行为的环境税率动态调整机制

在排污费改为环境税的背景下，为研究环境税率的最优设计，从组织行为的视角，利用演化博弈理论，建立地方政府和排污企业的演化博弈模型；在静态环境税率的基础上提出环境税率动态调整机制，并验证该调整机制抑制演化过程中波动的有效性。结果表明:环境税率动态调整是必要的；适当降低经济指标权重并提高环境指标权重、提高环境税征收强度、降低政府监测成本均能有效提高排污企业采取完全治污策略的概率，生产规模较小以及初始治污力度较高的排污企业最终采取完全治污策略的概率较低。认为应改善上级政府对地方政府的政绩考核指标；加强税收部门和环保部门之间的协作配合；适当提高环境税征收强度；加强对小生产规模排污企业的监管。

Analysis of Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism for Environment Tax based on Enterprises' Pollution Control Behavior

Under the background that pollution charge had been changed to environment tax, to study the optimal design of environment tax rate, this article, from the perspective of organization behavior theory, established an evolutionary game model between local government and pollution emission enterprises on the basis of evolutionary game theory. Then the dynamic adjustment mechanism was put forward on the basis of static environment tax rate and it was proved that the mechanism could effectively control the fluctuation in the evolutionary process. The result shows that dynamic adjustment is necessary;reducing the weight of economic indicators, increasing environment tax rate and reducing the cost of government supervision are effective ways to increase the probability of enterprises''adopting complete pollution control behavior; enterprises with a small production scale and enterprises which were effectively controlling pollution at the initial stage are least likely to control pollution thoroughly in the end. Some suggestions were put forward to solve the problem, such as improving state government''s assessment index on local governments, strengthening the cooperation between environmental protection departments and taxation authorities, properly increasing environment tax rate, and strengthening the supervision of emission enterprises with a small pollution scale.