| 充分信息与我国公司内部治理结构的委托代理问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 丁月华,马辉. 充分信息与我国公司内部治理结构的委托代理问题[J]. 西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2003, 13(3): 40-43 |
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| 作者姓名： | 丁月华 马辉 |
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| 作者单位： | 河北经贸大学,河北,石家庄,056001 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文分析了公司内部治理结构中委托代理关系中存在的问题,指出这些问题主要是表现在逆向选择和道德风险上,这主要是由于信息不对称引起的,并且指出现存的几种内部控制机制的弊端,提出必须建立充分信息才能从根本上消除这些问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 充分信息 完全竞争 机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-472X(2003)03-0040-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003-06-11 |
On Full Information and Agency by Agreement of Internal Management Structure in China''''s Corporations |
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| DING Yue-hua,MA Hui. On Full Information and Agency by Agreement of Internal Management Structure in China''''s Corporations[J]. Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition), 2003, 13(3): 40-43 |
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| Authors: | DING Yue-hua MA Hui |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes problems in agency by agreement of internal management structure in corporations. It points out that these problems are manifested by reverse options and risks in virtue, which are caused by unsymmetry in information. Furthermore, it points out some existing malpractices in internal control mecharisma and it holds that only through the establishment of full information system can these problems be completely solved. |
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| Keywords: | agency by agreement full information complete competition market system |
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