| 基于委托—代理模型的收费公路经营权转让激励方案研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 张莹.基于委托—代理模型的收费公路经营权转让激励方案研究[J].统计与信息论坛,2012,27(4):82-86. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 长安大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710064;西安财经学院统计学院,陕西西安710100 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 高速公路经营权转让的转让方与受让方是委托代理关系.基于委托一代理理论讨论了两种转让契约激励模型的设计,即单一以经济效益产出为依据的激励方案和由经济效益、社会效益相结合为依据的激励方案,对两者进行了比较研究,并通过问卷调查进一步验证了模型分析的结论:外界环境的不稳定性、企业的风险规避度与企业的收益之间成反比;采取包含非经济因素在内的激励方案,对转让、受让双方都有利.
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| 关 键 词： | 收费公路经营权 委托代理 激励 |
Research of Motivation Programs of Toll Roads Management Right Transfer Based on the Principal-agent Model |
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| ZHANG Ying.Research of Motivation Programs of Toll Roads Management Right Transfer Based on the Principal-agent Model[J].Statistics & Information Tribune,2012,27(4):82-86. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Ying |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Ying 1,2(1.School of Economic and Management,Chang’an University,Xi’an 710064,China;2.School of Statistics,Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’an 710100,China) |
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| Abstract: | The transferer and transferee of highway management right transfer is principal-agent relationship.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper discusses and compares two motivation model designs.One motivation model is only based on the output of economic benefit;and the other is based on the output of economic returns and social benefit.Through the survey,it supports the the conclusion : the unstability of outer environment and Arrow-Pratt are inversely proportional to the return of the enterprise;applying the motivation program including the nonfinancial factor is beneficial to the transferer and the transferee. |
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| Keywords: | management right of toll roads principal-agent motivation |
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