The logic of preference reconsidered

Preferences are an important object of study in economic theory. Their logico-mathematical study has become prominent with the raise of modern decision theory and with the new conceptions of utility-functions and personalistic probabilities. The ‘basic logic’ at the foundation of the more advanced theories of preference, however, has been relatively little investigated. The pioneer work is Hallden's The Logic of ‘Better’ of the year 1957, followed by von Wright's The Logic of Preference in 1963. The topic has turned out unexpectedly problematic and there is as yet little consensus among logicians about the basic laws of preferring. A reason for this is apparently that there exist several concepts of preference which must be disentangled and kept apart in a logical theory. How this is to be done is discussed in the introductory sections (1–5) of the present paper. In Section 8 is sketched a logic for an asymmetric and connected preference-relation which holds between ‘possible worlds’ within a subject's ‘preference-horizon’ (Section 7). Preferences between states of affairs generally are called holistic when they hold ceteris paribus, i.e., when there is a corresponding preference-relation between any pairs of possible worlds which differ only in those two states and in no others. (Section 6.) Holistic preferences between states are asymmetrical and transitive but they do not form a linear preference order. (Section 9.) Failure to notice this, the author maintains, is responsible for much confusion in the traditional treatment of the subject. In the concluding sections (10–12) the author discusses the mutual relations of the value-absolutes, the good and the bad. Can they be defined in the terms of the relative notion of betterness or preference (and logical constants) alone? The definition which says that the goodness of a state is the holistic preference of it over its contradictory, answers the question affirmatively but conflicts with several deep-rooted axiological intuitions of ours. A more satisfying definition of the value-absolutes requires the additional notion of a value-less state (world) with which all the other states may be compared. In this connection some ideas of G. E. Moore about the notion of an ‘empty’ world can be interestingly exploited.