A game theoretical analysis of an extended manager-auditor-conflict

Horst Albach has dealt in his research very often with problems of the quality of balance auditing (Albach 1992, 2003). Sometimes his considerations show close relations to the current crisis of the financial market and its consequences. Some of his contributions were already made in times, when it was not yet expected that the dependency of auditors from clients could once become a serious deficit of auditing. Those aspects also become relevant now in connection with the crisis of the financial market.The misgivings that arise continuously in this context with regard to the correctness of submitted balance sheets have sparked off intense discussions in two directions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Whereas the USA has already realised a prohibition of this nature to a great extent through statutory provisions, a broad spectrum of additional consultancy services is still permissible in the Federal Republic of Germany in spite of similar initiatives on the part of legislators.The present paper analyses methodically in the framework of an extended manager–auditor game how the Nash equilibrium is altered in a non-cooperative two-person game through the behaviour of the players, if the supervisory board, as an exogenous party, detects with a specific probability the incorrect certification of a substantively incorrectly prepared balance sheet. At the same time, payoffs from consultancy services for both players are included in the analysis here. However, with a greater probability of detection of an incorrectly certified incorrect balance sheet, and through the reductions of consultancy payoffs, the supervisory board can work towards the product of audit and publication quality being increased.