The fragility of cooperation: A false feedback study of a sequential iterated prisoner's dilemma |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Mental Health Promotion Project, Tokyo Metropolitan Institute of Medical Science, Tokyo, Japan;2. Department of Psychiatry, Tokyo Metropolitan Geriatric Hospital, Tokyo, Japan;3. Niigata University Graduate School of Medical and Dental sciences, Niigata, Japan;4. Department of Cardiology, Tokyo Metropolitan Tama Medical Center, Tokyo, Japan;1. School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi''an 710072, China;2. College of animal science and technology, Nanjing Agriculture University, Nanjing, 210095, China;1. College of Veterinary Medicine, Yunnan Agricultural University, Kunming, Yunnan 650201, China;2. College of Animal Science and Technology, Jiangxi Agricultural University, Nanchang, Jiangxi 330045, China;3. College of Veterinary Medicine, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510642, China;4. Jiangxi Engineering Research Center for Animal Health Products, Nanchang 330045, China;5. College of Engineering, Jiangxi Agricultural University, Nanchang, Jiangxi 330045, China |
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| Abstract: | We examined the mutability of naturally occurring mutual cooperation and mutual defection. Forty-five pairs of subjects participated in an extended iterated prisoner's dilemma (median duration 1807 trials) using a monetary payoff matrix. When stable cooperation or defection emerged, false feedback was provided indicating to each subject that his partner was choosing contrary to previously stable play. This was followed by recovery trials in which false feedback indicated to each subject that his partner had resumed making the previously stable choice.While stable cooperation occurred more frequently than stable defection, it was considerably more vulnerable to the false feedback manipulation. This was true both in terms of the extent to which choice changed in response to false feedback (p=0.006) and in terms of the extent to which the disruption persisted (p<0.001). While the effect of four false feedback cooperations was undone by a single recovery false feedback defection, the effect of even a single false feedback defection was still apparent after seven false feedback recovery cooperations. These results are discussed in relation to the analogy between interpersonal bargaining and intertemporal bargaining within individuals. |
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