食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析

针对频频出现的食品安全事件,以及食品供应链质量投入的外部正效应问题,建立了供应商与制造商食品质量投入的演化博弈模型,并进行求解分析。结果表明:食品供应商与制造商的质量投入策略与双方质量投入产出比密切相关,当双方质量投入产出比不断变化时,出现多种演化稳定均衡。如果"搭便车"行为从对方质量投入中获得的收益很大,则供应商或者制造商进行质量投入的积极性会大大降低。政府进行调控,对于"搭便车"行为进行惩罚,迫使供应商或制造商进行质量投入,对于质量投入产出比较小的供应商或制造商给予补贴,激励他们进行质量投入,增大食品的安全性。

Investment Decision of Food Supply Chain Quality Based on the Evolutionary Game

Food accidents occur frequently and the positive external effect of investment of food quality exits in the food supply chain. Investment decisions of suppliers and manufacturers in food safety are analyzed base on evolutionary game. The results show that the investment strategies of both suppliers and manufacturers are related to the ratio of input-output. When the input-output ratios of both game parties in the food supply chain change, some evolutionarily stable equilibrium is found. If 'free rider’ can gain a lot in the supply chain, suppliers or manufacturers will not like to invest in the food quality. The government will use macro-control to increase the food security level through two kinds of mechanisms. On one hand, it will punish the "free rider" behavior and force the supplier or manufacturer to input quality. On the other hand, it will provide subsidies for the supplier or manufacturer with a relatively small input-output ratio and encourage them to invest in quality.