On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members |
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| Authors: | Marc R Feix Dominique Lepelley Vincent R Merlin Jean-Louis Rouet |
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| Institution: | (1) Ecole des Mines de Nantes, SUBATECH, La chanterie, 4 rue A Kastler, BP 20722, 44307 Nantes cedex 3, France;(2) CERESUR, Department of Economics, Université de la Réunion, 97715 Saint-Denis cedex 9, France;(3) Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management (CREM), UMR6211 CNRS/Université de Caen, MRSH bureau 230, Esplanade de la Paix, 14032 Caen cedex, France;(4) Laboratoire de Mathématique, Applications et Physique Mathématique - UMR 6628, Université d’Orléans, UFR des Sciences, 45067 Orléans Cedex 2, France;(5) Institut des Sciences de la Terre d’Orléans (ISTO) UMR6113 CNRS, Université d’Orléans 1A, rue de la Férollerie, 45067 Orléans Cedex 2, France |
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| Abstract: | Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have
interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence
of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the
number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose
to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic
limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of
the European Union. |
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