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风险投资中的博弈分析
引用本文:丁茗. 风险投资中的博弈分析[J]. 苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2003, 0(3): 39-42
作者姓名:丁茗
作者单位:河海大学,经济学院,江苏,南京,210096
摘    要:本文运用展开博弈模型建立起风险投资中参与双方行为的数量关系,对博弈双方的投资策略行为进行理论和应用分析,重点研究了双方坚持投资策略的条件以及风险投资中的经济变量的数值变化对双方均衡策略的影响.

关 键 词:风险投资  展开型博弈模型  纳什均衡
文章编号:1001-4403(2003)03-0039-04
修稿时间:2002-12-15

Game Analysis in Venture Investment
DING Ming. Game Analysis in Venture Investment[J]. Academic Journal of Suzhou University(Philosophy and Social Sciences), 2003, 0(3): 39-42
Authors:DING Ming
Abstract:As a useful analytical method,the Came theory has been widely used in the economic and social fields. By an extensive Came mold, this paper establishes the quantity relations of the players in the venture invest, analyzes the investing strategy both in theory and application, and studies the investing conditions and the quantity change of the economic variables in venture invest and their implication to the equilibrium strategy.
Keywords:venture investment  extensive Came mold  Nash equilibrium  
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