Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria |
| |
Authors: | Antonio Romero-Medina Matteo Triossi |
| |
Institution: | 1. Departmento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903, Getafe-Madrid, Spain 2. Centro de Economía Aplicada, Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile, Avenida Republica 701, Santiago, Chile
|
| |
Abstract: | Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. We then introduce generalized games of manipulation in which hospitals move first and state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless restrictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|