| 我国煤矿企业安全投入的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈宁,林汉川.我国煤矿企业安全投入的博弈分析[J].太原理工大学学报(社会科学版),2006,24(2):64-66. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈宁 林汉川 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中南财经政法大学,经济学院,湖北,武汉,430060
2. 对外经济贸易大学,国际商学院,北京,100726 |
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| 摘 要： | 理论界普遍认为煤矿安全投入不足是导致煤矿安全事故频繁发生的直接原因,安全投入不足的背后原因却鲜有探讨。文章通过对煤矿企业与煤矿监管双方的博弈分析试图发现决定我国煤矿安全投入的深层原因,并进一步针对原因提出对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 煤矿安全事故规律 安全投入 安全监管 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-5837(2006)02-0064-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年3月9日 |
The Analysis of Game on Safety-investment in China's Coal Industry |
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| CHEN Ning,LIN Han-chuan.The Analysis of Game on Safety-investment in China''''s Coal Industry[J].Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2006,24(2):64-66. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Ning LIN Han-chuan |
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| Abstract: | Scholars generally think that lack of safety investment is the direct cause of frequently happened accidents in China's coal industry.However,few scholars study reasons of low safety-investment in coal industry.This paper is to find decisive factors of low safety investment in coalmines by gambling between coal enterprises and their supervisory offices.Moreover,this paper brings some advises to improve safety investment in coalmines. |
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| Keywords: | regularity of safety accidents in coal industry safety investment safety supervise |
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