我国管理层收购的动机偏离及其理论解释

作为一种新型的并购工具,我国的管理层收购在实行了一段时间以后,大型国有企业管理层收购被叫停。本文认为我国管理层收购不是从企业发展战略的角度实施,而作为国有企业产权改革的一种形式,管理层收购更多的是一种投机活动,即管理层收购的动机存在由战略收购到投机的偏离,造成国有资产的流失。本文从代理理论和价值低估理论出发,认为国有企业对管理层的激励机制不完善、待遇不足是动机偏离的内因,而企业价值能够被低估是动机偏离的诱因,究其实质则是由于我国国有企业产权不清晰、金融市场和价格形成机制不健全、法律法规不完善等原因造成的,进而得出在我国目前的条件下不宜大规模实行管理层收购。

Motivational Deviation and Its Theoretical Analyses on China's Management Buy-Out

As a new tool of mergers and acquisitions,operation of management buy-out,after a long time,the large scale state-owned enterprises were stopped in China.The present article suggests that the management buy-out is not based on an enterprise's development strategies,but as a form of reform in state-owned ownership,the management is a more speculative activities.That is to say,the motivation of management buy-out is deviated from the management strategies to speculative buying,resulting in the losses of stated-owned assets.From the acting theory and the theory of undervaluation,this article asserts that the imperfection of the state-owned enterprises' management incentive mechanism and the inadequate treatment are the motivation from internal cause,and the underestimation of enterprise's value is motivation from the incentive.The real reason is the unclear property rights of China's state-owned enterprises,the inadequate financial markets and the price formation mechanism,and the imperfect laws and regulations.The result in the current conditions is that Management Buy-Out is not suitable in massive operation.