Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori? |
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Authors: | Dan S Felsenthal Moshé Machover |
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Institution: | (1) University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel (e-mail: msdanfl@mscc.huji.ac.il), IL;(2) Department of Philosophy, King's College, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK (e-mail: moshe.machover@kcl.ac.uk), GB |
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Abstract: | For any simple voting game (SVG), we consider the question posed in the title from two different points of view as to what
voting power means. We also distinguish between blocs imposed by annexation and those formed voluntarily, and present some
general theoretical results concerning these notions. We illustrate our theoretical findings with examples using both toy
SVGs and the Qualified Majority Voting rule of the Council of Ministers of the European Community (CMEC). We show that when
voting power is understood as influence (I-power), forming a voluntary bloc may be advantageous even if its voting power is
smaller than the sum of the original powers of its members; and it may be disadvantageous even if its voting power is greater
than that sum.
Received: 9 February 2000/Accepted: 19 October 2000 |
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Keywords: | |
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