| 重大资产收购关联交易中的大股东“掏空”行为研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李姝,叶陈刚,翟睿.重大资产收购关联交易中的大股东“掏空”行为研究[J].管理学报,2009,6(4):513-519. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李姝 叶陈刚 翟睿 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南开大学商学院
2. 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 南开大学人文社会科学校内青年资助项目，南开大学面向21世纪教育振兴行动计划（985计划） |
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| 摘 要： | 采用实证分析的方法,以上市公司和大股东之间的重大资产收购关联交易为研究点,通过事件研究法,对关联交易公告日前后的市场反应进行检验,从而证实大股东确实存在通过关联交易"掏空"上市公司的行为,进而损害了投资者的利益.通过实证检验发现,当上市公司大股东以较复杂的持股方式控制上市公司时,此时其控制权和现金流权的分离度大,"掏空"上市公司、侵害投资者利益的动机大大增强.同时,对上市公司最终控制人类型作了详细的划分,并在模型中分别加以回归,得出相应的结论.最后,针对以上检验发现的问题,给出了有关对策建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 掏空 投资者保护 市场反应 关联方 |
Largest Shareholder's Tunneling in Related Assets Buying Transactions |
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| LI Shu,YE Chengang,ZHAI Rui.Largest Shareholder's Tunneling in Related Assets Buying Transactions[J].Chinese JOurnal of Management,2009,6(4):513-519. |
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| Authors: | LI Shu YE Chengang ZHAI Rui |
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| Institution: | 1.Nankai University;Tianjing;China;2.University of International Business and Economics;Beijing;China |
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| Abstract: | The characteristics of share structure of listed company subject to be tunneled were studied.The market response of related party transactions was examined by event study method.It is confirmed that the largest shareholder tunnels listed company in this way.It is seen through regression analysis that when the largest shareholder controls listed company in a complicated way,the control rights and cash flow rights separate deeper,which inspire the largest shareholder tunnel.Moreover,the ultimate controller of... |
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| Keywords: | tunneling investor protection market response related groups |
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