私家车合乘共享背景下居民通勤模式选择行为演化博弈

基于居民通勤模式选择视角，从出行效用和出行成本两个维度对私家车主和乘客的出行决策变量进行解构，运用演化博弈模型探讨私家车合乘共享服务的演化规律。研究发现:只有当供需两侧的初始规模超过临界规模时，才能激发正向的交叉网络外部性，实现全民参与合乘共享；供给侧临界规模相对较低，以供给侧拉动需求侧，演化时间更短。私家车主对合乘共享服务的接受速度与交通运行指数、私密性效用和价格水平正相关，与抽成比例负相关；乘客对合乘共享的接受速度与交通运行指数、舒适性效用正相关，与价格水平负相关。因此，平台既要在短期内对供给侧实行倾斜补贴，还需通过调整抽成比例、合理定价、完善技能培训和评价机制等措施，持续提升服务性价比和用户满意度。政府应合理确定每日接单上限，适当提高价格上限，设置合乘车道，鼓励通勤时段的合乘共享。

The Evolutionary Game of Residents' Commuting Mode Selection under the Background of Private Car Ride-sharing

From the perspective of residents' choice of commuting mode, the travel decision variables of private car owners and passengers are divided into two dimensions: travel utility and travel cost. An evolutionary game model is used to study the evolution of ride-sharing service in private cars. It is found that only when the initial scale on both sides of supply and demand exceeds the critical point, can the positive cross network externality of the platform be stimulated and the public participation in sharing can be realized. The critical point of the supply side is relatively low, and the evolution time is shorter when the supply side is used to pull the demand side. The acceptance speed of ride-sharing service by drivers is positively correlated with traffic time index, privacy utility and price level, and negatively correlated with commission rate. While the acceptance speed by passengers is positively correlated with traffic time index and comfort utility, and negatively correlated with price level. Therefore, the platform should not only implement preferential subsidies to the supply side in the short term, but also continuously improve the service cost performance and user satisfaction through measures such as adjusting commission rate, reasonable pricing, improving skills training and evaluation mechanism, etc. The government should determine a reasonable daily order limit, appropriately raise the price ceiling, set up shared lanes, and encourage ride-sharing during commuting time.