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银企金融交易:基于信息与制度层面的透视及制度创新
引用本文:胡豹,丁国杰. 银企金融交易:基于信息与制度层面的透视及制度创新[J]. 西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2003, 3(1): 44-48
作者姓名:胡豹  丁国杰
作者单位:浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州,310029
摘    要:中国经济转轨时期银企信用关系的扭曲 ,是银企金融交易中存在的最大问题。由于不完全契约、不对称信息和信用的次优博弈等市场缺陷的存在 ,银企金融交易中逆向选择和道德风险行为的存在不可避免。目前 ,运用制度创新的手段 ,改善微观经济运行环境 ,加强银企信用的培育是解决银企债务风险的一条有效途径。

关 键 词:不完全契约  不对称信息  信用博弈  金融交易
文章编号:1009-9107(2003)01-0044-05
修稿时间:2002-04-17

The Financial Transaction Between Bank and Enterprise: a Review Based on Information and Institution and Institutional Innovation
HU Bao,DING Guo jie. The Financial Transaction Between Bank and Enterprise: a Review Based on Information and Institution and Institutional Innovation[J]. Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition), 2003, 3(1): 44-48
Authors:HU Bao  DING Guo jie
Abstract:In the economic transitional period, the problem in the financial transaction between bank and enterprise is the distorting of credit relationship. Through analysis of the theory of incomplete contract, unsymmetrical information and credit sub-optional game, this article demonstrates that the harmful choice and moral hazard in financial transaction between bank and enterprise cannot be avoided. Basis on such analysis, some countermeasures such as the institutional arrangement and credit breeding in financial transaction between bank and enterprise have been put forward.
Keywords:incomplete contract  unsymmetrical information  credit game  financial transaction
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