| 企业与中介机构串谋财务舞弊的博弈模型与实证分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李丽青,师萍.企业与中介机构串谋财务舞弊的博弈模型与实证分析[J].长安大学学报(社会科学版),2004,6(4):29-32. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李丽青 师萍 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北大学,经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710069 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70072040) |
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| 摘 要： | 企业和中介机构是决定会计信息质量的两个关键主体,但由于中国存在对出具虚假会计信息者的处罚普遍过轻现象,使得他们的违规收益大于违规成本。这样,在博弈中达成串谋作假协议最终成为具有经济人特征的两个主体的理性选择。因此,治理财务舞弊的根本途径是加大对违规主体的处罚力度。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业 中介机构 财务舞弊 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-6248(2004)04-0029-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年11月3日 |
Game model and empirical analysis between enterprise and intermediary in faking accounting information |
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| LI Li-qing,SHI Ping.Game model and empirical analysis between enterprise and intermediary in faking accounting information[J].Journal of Chang'an University(Social Sciences Edition),2004,6(4):29-32. |
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| Authors: | LI Li-qing SHI Ping |
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| Abstract: | Enterprise and intermediary are the two main parties in determining the quality of information. In China, because of the over-slight punishment to the false accounting information offerers, their revenue is larger than violation cost. Thus, collusion is the rational choice to the two parties with the property of economic man. So, the most important approach of dealing with the financial disinformation is to reinforce the punishment to the false information disclosers. |
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| Keywords: | enterprise intermediary faking accounting information game |
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