两阶段基于信号博弈的声誉模型

建立了一个两时期基于信号博弈的声誉模型. 有两个参与人进行博弈,拥有私人信息的 参与人叫发送者,另一个不拥有私人信息的叫接收者;该声誉模型研究L 类(低能力类型) 发 送者是否有动机在第一时期建立声誉. 证明显示,如果L 类发送者在第一时期建立声誉,则他 在第二时期的最优信号更大,在第一时期的效用更小,但是,他将在第二时期获得更高的效用.

Two-period reputation model based on signaling game

This paper sets up a two-period reputation model based on signaling game. There are two players in the game , the one is sender with private information , and the other is receiver without private information. The reputa2 tion model studies the type L senders to see whether they have motive to set up reputation in period one or not . We show that the optimal signal of the type L sender is larger in the period two if he sets up reputation in the period one. The utility of the type L sender is less in the period one if he sets up reputation in the period one , but he will get the higher utility in the period two.