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“旁观者”现象的博弈分析
引用本文:陈建先.“旁观者”现象的博弈分析[J].重庆邮电大学学报(社会科学版),2014,26(6):101-104.
作者姓名:陈建先
作者单位:中共重庆市委党校 公共管理学教研部,重庆,400041
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目:现代投票规则的博弈研究(14B22082);重庆市教育委员会重庆市研究生教育优质课程项目:管理博弈论
摘    要:从博弈视角,分析旁观者现象存在的深层原因:搭车心理、规则不适和道德缺失;从博弈思维,寻找旁观者现象的路径改善:博弈模型---改变博弈支付,博弈规则---策略博弈调适,博弈道德---约束博弈范式;从博弈策略,运用两两对比方式:“搭车心理”与“博弈模型”,中国“彭宇案”与比利时“抢劫案”,“谁让谁吃亏”与“自我道德约束”等对比,提出博弈模型的行为方式、博弈规则的行为调适和博弈道德的行为范式。

关 键 词:旁观者  搭便车  规则调适  道德约束  博弈分析
收稿时间:2014/4/30 0:00:00
修稿时间:6/5/2014 12:00:00 AM

Game Analysis of Bystanders Phenomenon
CHEN Jianxian.Game Analysis of Bystanders Phenomenon[J].Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications:Social Science Edition,2014,26(6):101-104.
Authors:CHEN Jianxian
Institution:Department of Public Administration, Chongqing Party School of CPC, Chongqing 400041, China
Abstract:From the perspective of Game analysis, hitchhiking psychological, unsuited rules and moral failure are the three deep-seated causes of bystanders phenomenon. We can find three paths to improve bystanders phenomenon. That is changing Game payoffs from Game model, adjusting Game strategy form Game rules and constraining the Game paradigm from Game moral. On the contrast path of Game strategy between hitchhiking psychological and Game model, between China Peng Yu case and Belgium robbery case, between those who will suffer with humility and self-comparison moral restraint ,the thesis proposes the behavior patterns of Game model, behavior adaptation of Game rules and ethical behavior of Game paradigm.
Keywords:bystanders  hitchhiking  rules adjustment  moral constraints  game analysis
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