Nonbinary social choice for economic environments

Assume a finite integer l2 and a social choice correspondence mapping each (p, Z) into a nonempty subset (p, Z) of Z, where p is a profile of individual preferences and Z is a set of outcomes of cardinality l or more. Suppose that satisfies Arrow's choice axiom, independence of infeasible alternatives, and the Pareto criterion. If the preference domain is the family of profiles of classical economic preferences over the space of allocations of public goods, then is dictatorial.I am grateful for some especially helpful comments by Jerry Kelly, John Weymark, and two anonymous referees. In fact, they uncovered so many errors that I must revive the traditional disclaimer: All remaining mistakes are my own responsibility. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation, grants no. SES 9007953 and SES 9209039.