| Abstract: | Recently, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) reevaluated accounting for pension plans. The issue is emotional and highly political in nature. The FASB attempted to justify its approach on the basis of measuring economic activity, but it failed to provide much in the way of analytical support. This paper provides a managerial decision model and an economic basis for the existence of pension plans. A pension plan is described as a cost-saving, risk-sharing, incentive contract. The analysis is developed using agency theory. The model presented here meets three suggested objectives of an employer: 1. Maximization of utility through the maximization of profit 2. Ability to conform the risk characteristics of an employment contract to the risk characteristics of the employer 3. Diversification of the risk inherent in the employment contract Profit is maximized by producing cost savings associated with employee tenure and loyalty. Sharing cost savings with employees (i.e., offering a pension plan) meets the above objectives. The employer determines the optimal sharing rate for the expected cost savings. An examination of the employer's underlying decision process reveals implications for pension plan accounting which generally are consistent with and support the FASB's Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 5]. |
