BELIEFS ABOUT OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES IN A SEQUENTIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME |
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| Authors: | JENNIFER C. COATS WILLIAM S. NEILSON |
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| Affiliation: | Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO 63108. Phone 1-314-977-3855, Fax 1-314-977-1478, E-mail;George R. Jordan, Jr. Professor, Private Enterprise Research Center and Department of Economics, 4228 TAMU, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228. Phone 1-979-845-7352, Fax 1-979-862-8483, E-mail |
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| Abstract: | Experimental evidence is used to deduce players' beliefs about their opponents' concern for others. The experiment is a sequential public good provision game with a provision point and two different refund rules. A theory is constructed to show how early contributions should change with the refund rule depending on the first mover's beliefs about subsequent players' other-regarding preferences. The evidence rejects the hypothesis that early players believe that their opponents are inequality averse and also rejects the hypothesis that early players are concerned with security. The evidence is consistent with beliefs in spite, reciprocity, or a concern for security. (JEL H41 , C90 , D63 , D64 ) |
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