Formal governance,interfirm coordination,and performance in partnerships: An empirical investigation of a mediation model |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. School of Business Administration/Graduate School of Technology and Innovation Management, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST), 50 UNIST-gil, Ulju-gun, Ulsan, 689-798, South Korea;2. Johns Hopkins University, Carey Business School, 100 International Drive, Baltimore, MD, 21202, USA;3. SKK Graduate School of Business, Sungkyunkwan University, 53 Myungryundong 3 Ga, Jongro-Gu, Seoul, 110-745, South Korea |
| |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the extent to which formal governance mechanisms such as contracts and equity ownership affect interfirm coordination and partnership performance. We analysed data from a survey of 301 Korean firms to show that interfirm coordination partially mediates the relationship between contract completeness, defined as the extent to which a contract specifies task operations and contingencies, and partnership performance. Furthermore, we find that more complete contracts can attenuate the negative effects of equity ownership on coordination, and that this effect is particularly strong when partner tasks are interdependent and relational norms are weak. |
| |
| Keywords: | Interfirm partnerships Coordination Contracts Equity ownership Formal control Partnership performance |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
