控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究

本文分析控股股东是否通过关联交易,转移上市公司资源、侵占小股东利益.对中国上市公司1999-2001年的关联交易的实证检验结果发现:由控股股东控制的公司,其关联交易显著高于无控股股东控制的公司;控股股东担任高级管理者的公司,其关联交易显著高于控股股东不担任高级管理者的公司;控股股东持股比例和控股股东在董事会中的席位比例越高,关联交易越多,这意味着控股股东确实能够借助关联交易转移公司资源、侵占小股东利益.

Controlling Shareholder,Agency Problem and Related-party Transaction:Evidence from China''''s Listed Companies

The paper investigates whether the related-party transaction is a means of transferring firm resources and expropriation of minority shareholders used by controlling shareholder. The empirical results of related-party transactions in 1999-2001 from China s listed companies show that firms with controlling shareholder have more related-party transactions than firms without controlling shareholder, firms with top managers coming from controlling shareholder have more related-party transactions than firms with top managers not coming from controlling shareholder, and the ownerships and the directors of boards owned by controlling shareholder are positively correlated to related-party transactions. The results suggest that controlling shareholders do transfer firm s resources and expropriate minority shareholders by means of related-party transactions. This paper provides direct evidence for the agency conflict between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in China s listed companies.