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基金投资问题的信号博弈分析
引用本文:韩冰竹,张琳. 基金投资问题的信号博弈分析[J]. 南京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2011, 10(4): 74-78
作者姓名:韩冰竹  张琳
作者单位:南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京,211816
基金项目:江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目
摘    要:基金作为一种投资工具,对于促进我国经济发展有着重要作用。但众多基金公司违规行为的出现,严重阻碍了基金行业的健康发展。针对基金投资中存在的双方信息不对称现象,建立信号博弈模型,深入分析可能出现的三种均衡状态,得出分离均衡是最有效率均衡的结论,基金监管部门和基金投资者应当采取相关措施,促使基金市场实现分离均衡。

关 键 词:基金投资  信息不对称  信号博弈  均衡模型

Analysis of Fund Investment by Using Signaling Game Theory
HAN Bingzhu,ZHANG Lin. Analysis of Fund Investment by Using Signaling Game Theory[J]. Journal of Nanjing University of Technology(Social Science Edition), 2011, 10(4): 74-78
Authors:HAN Bingzhu  ZHANG Lin
Affiliation:(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Technology,Nanjing 211816,China)
Abstract:As a type of investment tool, fund has an important role in promoting China's economic development. However, many fund irregularities have seriously hindered the healthy development of fund industry. Based on the phenomena of information asymmetry between both parties in fund investment, this paper tries to establish a signaling game model and analyze three kinds of market equilibriums in fund investment. It is found that only separating equilibrium is the most efficient one and that fund supervision departments and fund investors should take appropriate measures to procure separating equilibrium in fund markets.
Keywords:fund investment  information asymmetry  signaling game  equilibrium model
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