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Information and preference aggregation
Authors:Donald E Campbell  Jerry S Kelly
Institution:(1) Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA (e-mail: decamp@malthus.morton.wm.edu), US;(2) Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA (e-mail: jskelly@maxwell.syr.edu), US
Abstract:We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice. Received: 20 August 1997/Accepted: 29 September 1998
Keywords:
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