| 基本建设项目寻租理论博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 项勇,任宏. 基本建设项目寻租理论博弈分析[J]. 辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 7(6): 601-603 |
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| 作者姓名： | 项勇 任宏 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,建设管理与房地产学院,重庆,400045 |
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| 摘 要： | 基建项目建设其实施过程中,代表国家行使项目建设相关权力部门和官员不可避免地受到寻租活动的影响,从而构成了国家、项目主管部门或官员、项目建设权力寻求者三方之间的博弈关系。利用寻租经济理论,探讨了基建项目中寻租行为存在的条件,分析了三者构成的博弈均衡解,根据均衡解给出了解决寻租活动的防止措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 寻租理论 基本建设项目 博弈行为 均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-391X(2005)06-0601-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-07-28 |
Game analysis of construction project on the basis of rent seeking theory |
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| XIANG Yong,REN Hong. Game analysis of construction project on the basis of rent seeking theory[J]. Journal of Liaoning Technical University(Social Science Edition), 2005, 7(6): 601-603 |
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| Authors: | XIANG Yong REN Hong |
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| Abstract: | During the implementation of project construction,the relevant right department and officer of project construction in the name of country will be unavoidably influenced by the fact of rent seeking activity.This forms the game relation among the country,project responsible institution(officer) and rent seeker.The article uses rent seeking theory and discusses condition of rent seeking behavior in construction project,then analyzes the game equilibrium among them and provide countermeasure of rent seeking activity according to game equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | rent-seeking theory construction project game behavior equilibrium |
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