| 政府行为与中小企业融资困境破解——基于序列博弈和委托代理的研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 贾海涛.政府行为与中小企业融资困境破解——基于序列博弈和委托代理的研究[J].西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2013(6):42-49. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 贾海涛 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 中国人民银行西安分行营管部,陕西西安710002 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 中小企业是市场经济的重要组成部分，是推动我国经济发展的主要动力之一，由于金融危机的冲击，中小企业融资难的问题日益突出。本文通过构建博弈模型和委托代理模型分析政府、银行各方的行为倾向对中小企业融资效率的影响，得出一些启发性的结论。
|
| 关 键 词： | 政府 序列博弈 双层委托代理 融资效率 |
The Government Behavior and SMEs Financing Dilemma Cracked |
| |
| JIA HAITAO.The Government Behavior and SMEs Financing Dilemma Cracked[J].Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition),2013(6):42-49. |
| |
| Authors: | JIA HAITAO |
| |
| Institution: | JIA HAITAO (The People＇s Bank of China business ＆Management Department Of Xi ＇an Branch ,Xi ＇an, 710071, China) |
| |
| Abstract: | SMS enterprises are an important part of the Marketing economy, and are a main driving force to promote our country＇s economic development. The financing problem of SMS enterprises has become more and more serious due to the financial crisis. This article will draw some creative conclusions by building game model and principal-agent model to analyze the influences of the behavior of the government and bank on the efficiency of the SMS enterprises. |
| |
| Keywords: | Government Sequential games Agency by agreement The efficiency of financing |
| 本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录！ |
