Rationality in policy making: Two concepts not one

The concept of rationality, central to any analysis of policy making, is shown to be dual. The qualitative concept of rationality, broadly equivalent to ‘appropriate’ directs the policy analyst to an examination of information flow (since it may be defective), of goals (since these may conflict), and of the momentum of decisions (since it can produce irrationality). The quantitative concept of rationality, broadly equivalent to ‘efficient’ is itself divisible into two models (‘ends–means’ and ‘alternative behaviour’). Either, however, directs the policy analyst to an exploration of alternatives (since ideally all should be known) and of evaluative techniques (since ideally these should indicate the best alternative). Quantitative, but not qualitative, rationality is frontally challenged by some theorists (notably Lindblom) and claimed to be insufficient by others (notably Dror).