| 基于委托代理理论的团购网站与供应商的激励研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 卢华玲,吴继飞. 基于委托代理理论的团购网站与供应商的激励研究[J]. 北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版), 2015, 0(2) |
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| 作者姓名： | 卢华玲 吴继飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆邮电大学经济管理学院,重庆,400065;重庆邮电大学经济管理学院,重庆,400065 |
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| 基金项目： | 重庆市哲学社会科学规划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用委托代理理论，设计了以团购网站为供应链核心企业的激励机制，讨论了团购网站对供应商的激励机制问题，得出以下结论：团购网站能力越强，付出的努力水平越高；供应商能力越强，越会更加努力地工作；团购网站给予能力越强的供应商越多的激励。
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| 关 键 词： | 团购网站 核心企业 委托代理 激励机制 |
Incentive Mechanism by Group-buy Website Based on Principal-agent Theory |
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| LU Hua-ling,WU Ji-fei. Incentive Mechanism by Group-buy Website Based on Principal-agent Theory[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition), 2015, 0(2) |
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| Authors: | LU Hua-ling WU Ji-fei |
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| Abstract: | Using principal-agent theory, the incentive mechanism is designed for the group-buy websites towards supply chain core enterprises and the group-buy websites’ incentive mechanism towards suppliers is discussed.The results show that the stronger the capacity of the group-buy websites is, the higher the degree of endeavor is;that the stronger the capacity of the suppliers is, the higher the level of the hard-working is; that the stronger suppliers can get more incentives from the group-buy websites. |
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| Keywords: | group-buy website core enterprise principal-agent incentive mechanism |
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