| Abstract: | Publishing performance information about local public services,an increasing trend in many Organisation for Economic Co-operationand Development countries, matters politically because it hasan effect on incumbent local governments' electoral support.Voters are able to use performance information to punish orreward incumbents in the elections that follow their publication,which may fill a gap in the chain of accountability betweenvoters and governments. We model the introduction of publishedComprehensive Performance Assessments of local authorities inEngland, which make summary information about performance availableto voters, as a "shock" to the relationship between voters andincumbents. Controlling for an unpublicized measure of performancechange over time, change in the local tax level, change in localeconomic conditions, and whether the local incumbent is theparty of the incumbent government at the national level, wefind negativity bias. Incumbents in local authorities in the"poor" performance category experience a substantial reductionin aggregate vote share at the election following publication,but there is no similarly sized reward for those in the highestperformance category. |
