以山东临工曲线MBO为例论大股东与管理层合谋

美国经济学家斯蒂格勒和布坎南提出合谋的概念后,股东与经理的关系就从代理理论的代理关系拓展到合谋关系,即大股东与管理层勾结共同侵害中小股东的利益。大股东与经理合谋的原因有多种,其中最主要的是大股东监督机制的弱化。本文以山东临工曲线MBO为例,分析了南方香江股权收购原上市公司山东临工背后,大股东借壳上市和管理层MBO的真正目的以及大股东与管理层合谋的过程和经济后果。在我国当前的市场环境中,需要不断完善企业的制衡机制和法律规范,才能有效防止大股东与管理层的合谋行为,从而更好的保护中小投资者的利益。

Collusion of the Major Shareholders and the Managers,Using the Indirect MBO Courses of Shandong Lingong Construction Machinery Co.,Ltd as an Example

After the American economists introducing the concept of collusion,people begin to think the relationship between the shareholders and managers as cahoots,which indicates that the major shareholders and managers will collude to encroach upon the interest of the minor shareholders,in addition to the principle-and-agent relationship embedded in agency theory.There are various reasons for them to collude,the most important of which is that the monitor mechanism for major shareholders is weakened.This paper uses the indirect MBO courses of Shandong Lingong Construction Machinery Co.,Ltd as an example,analyzing the true purpose of the major shareholders and manager beyond the superficies of the share purchase transaction.And it analyses the courses of how the two groups collude as well as the economic consequences.In our current market environment,it is necessary to enhance the monitor mechanism of companies and modify the laws to regulate the behavior of the major shareholders and managers and reduce the negative consequences generated by collusion,then protect the interest of the minor shareholders.