| 基于一级密封的工程量清单投标报价的博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 吕炜,任玉珑,季玉华. 基于一级密封的工程量清单投标报价的博弈模型[J]. 管理工程学报, 2007, 21(1): 122-126 |
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| 作者姓名： | 吕炜 任玉珑 季玉华 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过运用博弈论中一级密封价格拍卖理论,研究了建设工程投标企业在不完全信息下的工程量清单投标报价博弈模型.该模型考虑了各工程量清单子项的单位成本分布函数、投标企业的报价函数以及投标企业竞标成功的概率等因素,通过对模型解的分析得出投标企业的最优投标报价策略.
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| 关 键 词： | 工程量清单 投标企业 竞价模型 一级密封价格拍卖 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6062(2007)01-0122-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-01-25 |
Bidding Game Model of Bill of Quantities Based on First-Price Sealed Auction |
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| L Wei,REN Yu-long,JI Yu-hua. Bidding Game Model of Bill of Quantities Based on First-Price Sealed Auction[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2007, 21(1): 122-126 |
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| Authors: | L Wei REN Yu-long JI Yu-hua |
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| Affiliation: | L(U) Wei,REN Yu-long,JI Yu-hua |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the bidding game model of project tender company with incomplete information in the bidding market of bill of quantities,by using the first-price sealed auction.The model considers many factors,such as distribution function of the unit cost of the items of the bill of quantities,bidding function of the tender company,the probabilities of winning of the tender company and so on.This paper concludes that the optimal strategy of bidding company by analyzes the value of the equation. |
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| Keywords: | bill of quantities tender company bidding model the first-price sealed auction |
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