反腐败高压下政府、投资商和官员三方博弈关系研究

文章基于博弈论思想，在建立政府、投资商、官员两两参与的混合策略博弈模型的基础上，构建了政府、投资商、官员三方参与的混合策略博弈模型，通过分析模型的混合策略纳什均衡，提出了降低投资商向官员行贿和官员受贿概率的建议。研究结果表明:投资商行贿行为、官员受贿行为的概率与政府查明投资商和官员之间行贿受贿的能力、政府反腐败的成本、政府对投资商行贿行为和官员受贿行为的惩罚力度等因素有关。因此，利用信息手段提高政府查明投资商和官员之间行贿受贿的能力、降低政府反腐败的成本、加大对投资商行贿行为和官员受贿行为的惩罚力度，能够有效提高政府的反腐败效率。

Study on the Tripartite Game of Government,Investors and Officials under High Pressure of Anti-corruption

On the basis of the game theory, this paper builds the tripartite game model of government, investors and officials based on building the game models of investors and officials, government and investors, government and officials. It gives suggestions for reducing the probabilities of investors bribing officials and officials taking bribes by analyzing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The results show that the probabilities of investors bribing officials and officials taking bribes are affected by the ability of government finding out bribery between investors and officials, government's cost of anti-corruption, punishments for investors and officials, etc.Thus, using information means to improve government's ability to identify bribery between investors and officials, reduce government's anti-corruption costs, and increase penalties for investors' bribery and officials' bribery can effectively improve the government's anti-corruption efficiency.