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基于顾客不公平规避的服务定价研究
引用本文:刘健,赵洪款,刘思峰.基于顾客不公平规避的服务定价研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(2):46-53.
作者姓名:刘健  赵洪款  刘思峰
作者单位:1. 南京理工大学经济管理学院, 江苏 南京 210094; 2. 南京航空航天大学经济管理学院, 江苏 南京 211106
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671092;71301075);江苏省自然科学基金青年项目(BK20130770);博士后国际交流计划派出项目(21040072);江苏省博士后科研资助计划项目(1501040A);南京理工大学"卓越计划紫金之星"项目
摘    要:设计合理的服务机制和定价策略对于企业运营至关重要。由于顾客异质性(等待时间成本不同)企业通常对顾客进行分类服务,然而分类服务会引发顾客的不公平心理,并带来负效用,从而引起顾客流动与转移,进而影响企业收益与社会成本。本文针对垄断型服务系统中,顾客不公平规避心理(用参数α表示)对于企业优化目标的影响进行分析,在此基础之上,研究企业是否对顾客采取分类服务以及如何合理定价。结果表明,当顾客不公平规避偏好心理较弱时,从社会成本最小化和企业收益最大化的角度都应该对顾客进行分类服务并收取优先服务费用。当顾客不公规避心理较强时,从企业收益最大化的角度应仅保留优先权顾客并收取优先服务费用,从社会成本最小化的角度则应取消优先服务费用仅保留普通顾客。最后,通过数值模拟和理论分析对上述结论进行验证。

关 键 词:排队论  不公规避  服务定价  顾客分类  目标优化  
收稿时间:2016-05-31
修稿时间:2016-12-22

A Study of Service Pricing with Unfairness Averse Customers
LIU Jian,ZHAO Hong-kuan,LIU Si-feng.A Study of Service Pricing with Unfairness Averse Customers[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2018,26(2):46-53.
Authors:LIU Jian  ZHAO Hong-kuan  LIU Si-feng
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
Abstract:Pricing and Queuing Mechanism Design is critical to enterprise operations.The enterprises often adopt classification of services through setting priority due to the different waiting cost of customer. While, the regular customers will get unfairness aversion psychology because their waiting time is longer (W2>W1) than the waiting time of priority customers. The innovation of this paper is that the above unfairness aversion psychology is conidered that caused by comparison will bring negative service utility α(W2-W1) for regular customers and change their service utility, which caues the flow of customers (customers select the regular service or priority service based on their total service utility) and influencing the enterprise revenue and social cost. In this paper, the relations between customer unfairness aversion psychology(use unfairness aversion parameter α to denote) and enterprise revenue and social cost are studied,respectively.On the basis, whether the monopolistic service enterprises should adopt priority services and the service pricing is discussed. By optimizing the objective functions and analyzing the relationship between the unfairness aversion parameter and the optimized results, following conclusions are drawn.From the perspective of enterprise revenue maximizing or social cost minimizing, enterprises should adopt the classification of services and charge priority service fee when unfairness aversion psychology is weaker. When unfairness aversion psychology is stronger, from the perspective of enterprise revenue maximizing, to retain only priority customers and charge priority service fee is optimal. From the perspective of social cost minimizing, the enterprises should cancel the classification of services, retain only regular customers and charge no priority service fee. Enterprise managers can consider the above management insights as a reference and choose the optimal service mechanism and pricing strategy with the change of customer unfairness aversion psychology.
Keywords:queuing theory  unfairness aversion  service pricing  customer classification  qbject optimization  
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