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辩诉交易制度的经济分析
引用本文:王春燕.辩诉交易制度的经济分析[J].武汉大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2004,57(1):95-99.
作者姓名:王春燕
作者单位:喀什师范学院,政法系,新疆,喀什,844000
摘    要:经济分析认为辩诉交易是一种交易成本大于零的交易,它虽节约了惩罚成本但也降低了犯罪者成本,在提高刑事诉讼效率的同时又带来巨大的负的外部性。我国在现行法律制度下移植辩诉交易不仅成本巨大且未必有价值。因此,要理性地看待利弊兼有的辩诉交易制度。

关 键 词:辩诉交易  成本  外部性  法律移植
文章编号:1672-7320(2004)01-0095-05
修稿时间:2003年9月22日

On the Economic Analysis of Plea Bargaining System
WANG Chun-yan.On the Economic Analysis of Plea Bargaining System[J].Wuhan University Journal (Social Sciences),2004,57(1):95-99.
Authors:WANG Chun-yan
Abstract:This paper attempts to make an economic analysis of Plea Bargaining system and argues that Plea Bargaining needs cost. Plea Bargaining economizes the punitive cost to some extent. However it reduces the cost of culprit. Though Plea Bargaining raises the efficiency of criminal proceedings, it brings about great negative externalities. The transplant of Plea Bargaining in the current legal system in China is of little value as well as expends high cost. Therefore, the paper suggests a rational consideration on Plea Bargaining system.
Keywords:plea bargaining  cost  externalities  legal transplant  
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