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小股东起诉代表大股东利益董事的博奔分析
引用本文:苏圻涵,赵静华. 小股东起诉代表大股东利益董事的博奔分析[J]. 同济大学学报(社会科学版), 2003, 14(2): 89-92
作者姓名:苏圻涵  赵静华
作者单位:1. 同济大学经济与管理学院
2. 上海毅石律师事务所
摘    要:本文通过对一般情况及引入承诺行动后小股东起诉代表大股东利益董事的博弈分析 ,提出一种保护中小股东利益的有效机制 ,从而在一定程度上减少上市公司董事会在制定企业经营方案、投资计划、股利分配方案及其他政策时出现偏袒大股东、侵犯小股东利益的情况。

关 键 词:股东利益  起诉  承诺行动  博弈

A Game Analysis about the Small Shareholders'''' Accusation of the Board Members on Behalf of the Big Shareholders'''' Interest
Su Qihan,Zhao Jinghua. A Game Analysis about the Small Shareholders'''' Accusation of the Board Members on Behalf of the Big Shareholders'''' Interest[J]. Journal of Tongji University(Social Science Section), 2003, 14(2): 89-92
Authors:Su Qihan  Zhao Jinghua
Abstract:Based on the game analysis of about the small shareholders' accusation of the board members on behalf of the big shareholders' interest under normal circumstances and the introduction of commitment, an effective mechanism to protect the interest of the small shareholders is introduced in this paper. This will stop the violation of the small shareholders' interest and inclination to the interest of the big shareholders when the board makes projects of operation, investment, bonus distribution and other policies.
Keywords:Shareholder's Interest  Litigation  Commitment  Game
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