| Abstract: | This article investigates the effects of changes in market conditions and the financial structure of domestic petroleum firms on employment and investment in offshore oil leases. Important theoretical issues include the extent to which managerial power in firms has been challenged by intervention from financial markets and institutional investors and the effects of changes in financial control on employment and inventory investment. A pooled cross-section time series data set was assembled for forty large oil companies for 1978–1989. A dynamic analysis of company employment levels and investment in offshore oil leases in the Central Gulf of Mexico reveals that falling oil prices and lower domestic oil consumption reduced spending on offshore leases. Some support was found for the agency theory's claim that lower free cash flow reduced spending on offshore leases in the late eighties. Support was also found for an executive defense strategy (Useem 1993), where petroleum company managers reduced lease spending and employment as an adaptation to changes in market fundamentals and external threats from capital markets and institutional investors. |
