Strategic behavior under partial cooperation |
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Authors: | Subhadip Chakrabarti Robert P. Gilles Emiliya A. Lazarova |
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Affiliation: | 1.Management School,Queen’s University Belfast,Belfast,Northern Ireland, UK;2.Department of Economics,University of Birmingham,Birmingham,UK |
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Abstract: | We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash’s best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return. |
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