Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict |
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Authors: | Esteban Joan Sákovics József |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Edinburgh, 50 George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JY, UK. E-mail |
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Abstract: | We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and varying vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect. |
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Keywords: | alliance coalition formation conflict |
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