A constitutional theory of the family |
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| Authors: | Alessandro Cigno |
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| Affiliation: | (1) University of Florence, Florence, Italy;(2) CESifo, Munich, Germany;(3) Center for Household, Income, Labor, and Demographic Economics, Torino, Italy;(4) Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Bonn, Germany;(5) Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato, via delle Pandette 21, 50127 Florence, Italy |
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| Abstract: | The paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies the circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with those of more conventional models. |
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| Keywords: | Families Self-enforcing constitutions Renegotiation-proofness Altruism Fertility Saving Transfers Attention Pensions Credit rationing |
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